Spruce Point Capital Management Releases A Strong Sell Research Opinion On LHC Group, Inc. (Nas: LHCG)

January 15, 2020 10:00

NEW YORK, Jan. 15, 2020 /PRNewswire/ -- Report entitled "Treating Investors ALMOST Like Family" outlines how LHC Group, Inc. ("LHCG") faces 35%-65% downside risk to approximately $60-$90 per share. The full contents of the report can be reviewed at www.sprucepointcap.com. Through forensic accounting and a close analysis of company filings, Spruce Point finds evidence that performance at Almost Family ("AFAM") – another home health service provider with which LHCG conducted a merger of equals in 2018 – has seriously deteriorated since the acquisition. With AFAM now seemingly experiencing negative sales growth, Spruce Point also observes signs that management is taking measures to obfuscate this contraction, and to avoid including AFAM in its calculation of company-wide organic growth. We believe that the market misunderstands LHCG's true growth profile as a result, and harbor serious doubts as to management's credibility and the continued viability of its roll-up strategy.

  • AFAM Appears To Be Contracting: Disclosures regarding acquired inorganic revenue imply that AFAM has severely underperformed both Company and sell-side expectations. We estimate that AFAM revenue is now contracting after it was first expected to grow 5-6% per year. Management appears to avoid reporting AFAM growth, or has cherry-picked unrepresentative metrics which superficially project the appearance of improvement.

  • Management Jumping Through Hoops To Flatter Organic Growth?: Management excludes AFAM from organic sales even though it was acquired ~21 months ago. This omission inflates reported organic growth by ~500 bps, from less than 2% to ~7%. Selective divestments of underperforming locations also inflate reported organic growth. This has saved a key LHCG metric – one followed closely by sell-side analysts – from collapsing at the hands of AFAM headwinds.

  • The Cause – Bungled Integration? Or Customer Reallocation?: AFAM throughput appears to have suddenly collapsed immediately after the deal's closure, and has since fallen more than 30% below pre-deal levels. Throughput at legacy LHCG locations has simultaneously expanded by close to 10%. Could AFAM's apparent contraction be explained by the cannibalization (purposeful or not) of AFAM locations by legacy LHCG locations? If so, LHCG's high single-digit reported organic growth is being supported directly by cutbacks at locations not yet included in the organic base, which will inevitably weigh on organic growth once they are in fact included (as they should be already). We also find that, after claiming that the integration would be extremely swift, management has since subtly pushed forward its integration timeline on an almost quarterly basis. Today, more than two years after management first stated that the integration was already nearly complete, it is still in the process of integrating AFAM into LHCG's software, and had integrated only about half of AFAM locations by the end of last quarter. We harbor significant doubts as to the competence of LHCG management and the continued viability of its roll-up strategy given these apparent integration issues.

  • Concerning Purchase Accounting Adjustments: Management appears to have gradually increased AFAM's bad debt allowance from $27M to $65M, suggesting that nearly half of acquired AFAM receivables may be uncollectible. The post-M&A purchase accounting adjustment window may also be giving LHCG a chance to take effective asset write-downs which do not flow through the income statement, and, therefore, which do not hit earnings. This, combined with ~$67M worth of integration costs through ~2 years and counting, has destroyed over $100M of shareholder value for holders of LHCG, nearly 15% of the AFAM purchase price.

  • We See 35%-65% Downside After Taking Into Account LHCG's True Organic Growth, Earnings, And Business Risks: LHCG remains a popular "buy" among analysts enamored by the Company's seemingly-robust organic growth profile and runway for tuck-in M&A, particularly following an Oct 31 update to Medicare's Patient-Driven Groupings Model which was broadly perceived to be supportive of continued industry consolidation. Even then, the average analyst price target implies only 3% upside from current levels. Why should investors own stock in a Company which, in our opinion, misrepresents its organic growth profile by 500bps, and whose management cannot effectively carry out its strategy at large scale? We expect organic underperformance and disappointing earnings to result in significant valuation compression from LHCG's current 20.6x '20E EBITDA multiple – an all-time high for the stock.

Spruce Point Capital has a short position in LHC Group, Inc. (LHCG) and stands to benefit if its share price falls.

About Spruce Point Capital
Spruce Point Capital Management, LLC, is a forensic fundamentally-oriented investment manager that focuses on short-selling, value and special situation investment opportunities.

Contact 
Sean Donohue  
Spruce Point Capital Management 
sean.donohue@sprucepointcap.com 
212-519-9813

Spruce Point Capital Management, LLC is a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, CRD number 288248.

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SOURCE Spruce Point Capital Management, LLC

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